My Body, My Temple: The Constitutional Requirement for Religious Exemptions to a COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate by Davisson, Ben
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Scholarship Commons 
SLU Law Journal Online 
2-24-2021 
My Body, My Temple: The Constitutional Requirement for 
Religious Exemptions to a COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate 
Ben Davisson 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lawjournalonline 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Davisson, Ben, "My Body, My Temple: The Constitutional Requirement for Religious Exemptions to a 
COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate" (2021). SLU Law Journal Online. 59. 
https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lawjournalonline/59 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in SLU Law Journal Online by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu. 
 




My Body, My Temple: The Constitutional Requirement for Religious 






While the COVID-19 crisis has caused many to fear the threat that the virus 
poses to the health and safety of themselves and their loved ones, for others, 
and particularly for those with certain religious beliefs, the cure is worse 
than the disease. Long ago, in 1905, the Supreme Court held in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts1 that a state may constitutionally require its residents to 
comply with mandatory vaccination laws. However, much has happened 
in the way of constitutional law in the 115 years since that case was decided. 
Beginning in the 1930s and 40s, the Court embarked upon an excursion into 
delimiting the boundaries of the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of 
the First Amendment. And since the passage of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act2 in 1993 up through recent landmark free exercise cases 
such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby3 and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission,4 both Congress and the Court have displayed a 
trend toward granting broad religious rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause. Thus, at least where religious liberties are at stake, Jacobson may no 
longer have the teeth that it was once thought to have. A state that attempts 
to enact mandatory vaccination laws in response to the COVID-19 crisis 
must take into account these developments in religious freedom law and 
offer alternatives for those members of its constituency who cannot in good 
conscience submit themselves to injecting a substance into their bodies in 
violation of their deepest and most personal religious beliefs and 
convictions. 
 
After a brief discussion of the COVID-19 crisis, the vaccine, and the 
controversy that surrounds it, this analysis will explore the outer limits of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Saint Louis University School of Law; Online Editor, Saint Louis 
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1 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq. (2018). 
3 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
4 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 




the Jacobson holding as it might pertain to a mandatory vaccination law 
before ultimately concluding that the First Amendment requires greater 
accommodation of religious rights than Jacobson would otherwise suggest. 
This analysis will then set forth two alternate theories — lack of general 
applicability and hybrid rights — that require laws denying religious 
exemptions to undergo heightened scrutiny. It will then conclude that, 
under strict scrutiny review, a mandatory vaccination law that denies 




In the early days of 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
announced a mysterious group of pneumonia-like cases in Wuhan, China, 
postulating that they likely arose from an entirely new coronavirus.5 In a 
couple short months, this small cluster of cases mushroomed into what is 
now known as the COVID-19 pandemic.6 In an effort to stave of the 
potentially devastating effects of the virus, business shut down, schools 
sent their students home, and people all across the globe began to lock 
themselves inside their homes. Many thought that this crisis would last for 
a few months at the most. It didn’t. 
 
Six months later, things hardly look “normal.” Office buildings still remain 
empty, parents are mining the recesses of their memories to remember how 
long division works so that they can teach it to their grade-schoolers who 
are spending yet another semester at home, people on the sidewalks dive 
into bushes at the sight of a passerby in order to avoid entering his six-foot 
bubble, and surgical-style facemasks are now a bona fide fashion staple. 
While some might revel in showing off their expensive designer masks to 
their friends, and others may enjoy their workplace’s new no-pants-
required dress policy, there is a common understanding that this mode of 
living is not sustainable. Enter the COVID-19 vaccine. 
  
Scientists are hard at work on developing an effective vaccine against the 
virus. Ordinarily, this is lengthy process, which can take ten to fifteen 
 








years.7 At a mere four years, the mumps vaccine is the current record holder 
for fastest time to develop a vaccine and bring it to market.8 The U.S. 
government, however, is looking to roll out a COVID-19 vaccine as early as 
January 2021 — less than a year since the virus was first declared a global 
health emergency!9 Potential safety concerns associated with such 
expedited development aside, this news is certain to bring hope to the high-
risk segment of the population as well as those who are otherwise 
apprehensive about contracting the virus. 
  
This would all be fine and great if those who wished to avail themselves of 
the vaccine’s protection could take the vaccine while others who, for 
whatever reason, might wish to forego the treatment could choose to do so. 
However, due to concerns over the delay that mass opt-outs could cause to 
achieving herd immunity,10 some officials are pushing for mandatory 
immunization.11 While principles of American federalism might make 
nationwide vaccine mandates tricky to accomplish — indeed, White House 
Coronavirus Task Force director Dr. Anthony Fauci has assured that the 
COVID-19 vaccine will not be mandated by the federal government12 — 
officials in some state and local governments, such as Virginia’s health 
commissioner, have expressed an intent to mandate the vaccine.13 
 
Such mandatory vaccination laws might create friction with a large segment 
of the American population, as a Gallup survey revealed that around thirty-
 
7 Amy McKeever, Dozens of COVID-19 vaccines are in development. Here are the ones to 




9 Id.; A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, supra note 5. 
10 “Herd immunity” refers to the phenomenon that occurs when a “threshold proportion” 
of the population achieves immunity to a disease, making person-to-person spread 
unlikely. Herd immunity and COVID-19 (coronavirus): What you need to know, MAYO CLINIC 
(June 6, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/in-
depth/herd-immunity-and-coronavirus/art-20486808. 
11 A. Pawlowski, Will the COVID-19 vaccine be mandatory?, TODAY (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.today.com/health/will-covid-19-vaccine-be-mandatory-t190838.  
12 Aayushi Pratap, Fauci: Covid-19 Vaccines Unlikely To Be Mandatory, FORBES (Aug. 18, 
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aayushipratap/2020/08/18/fauci-covid-19-vaccines-
unlikely-to-be-mandatory/#565545715a01. 
13 Pawlowski, supra note 11. 
 




five percent of Americans would not take the vaccine, even if it were free.14 
In addition to concerns over the safety and efficacy of vaccines, many 
people cite religious reasons for their reluctance to receive the shot.15 The 
Church of Christ, Scientist, is the most well-known religious opponent of 
mandatory vaccination laws, and through its lobbying efforts, has helped 
to pass religious vaccine exemption laws in most states.16 While not 
doctrinally mandated, prayer-based healing is central to the Christian 
Science faith and has motivated the church’s efforts in lobbying for vaccine 
exemptions in the past.17 In fact, the religion’s main text, titled Science and 
Health, focuses specifically on the connection between the miraculous 
healing acts of Jesus and a mind-over-matter approach to healing, and 
discourages reliance on pharmaceuticals and mainstream western 
medicine.18 Outside of Christian Science, vaccine refusal is not a core tenant 
of any major religion, although some religious devotees may still invoke 
their faith as a reason to forgo vaccination.19 For example, many Catholics 
have refused vaccinations that were created from cell lines from a 
voluntarily aborted fetus.20 Some Orthodox Protestants, on the other hand, 
simply claim that vaccination interferes with divine providence.21 
Additionally, certain Muslims might deny a vaccine if it contains gelatin 
derived from a non-halal22 animal, whereas a Buddhist might similarly 
 
14 Shannon Mullen O’Keefe, One in Three Americans Would Not Get COVID-19 Vaccine, 
GALLUP (Aug. 7, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317018/one-three-americans-not-
covid-vaccine.aspx.  
15 Chephra McKee & Kristin Bohannon, Exploring the Reasons Behind Parental Refusal of 
Vaccines, 21(2) J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 104, 104 (2016). 
16 Julia Belluz, Religion and vaccine refusal are linked. We have to talk about it., VOX (June 19, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/6/19/18681930/religion-vaccine-refusal. 
17 A Christian Science perspective on vaccination and public health, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, 
https://www.christianscience.com/press-room/a-christian-science-perspective-on-
vaccination-and-public-health (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
18 Siobhan Hegarty, Why Christian Scientists believe in ‘prayerful healing’ — and what they 
think of a COVID-19 vaccine, ABC NEWS (AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION) (Sept. 
20, 2020) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-21/christian-science-religion-prayer-
vaccination-covid-medicine/12678764.  
19 See Belluz, supra note 16.  
20 Gordana Pelčić et al., Religious exception for vaccination or religious excuses for avoiding 
vaccination, 57(5) Croatian Med. J. 516 (2016), available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5141457/. 
21 Id. 
22 The term “halal” refers to meat that has been slaughtered in accordance with Islamic 
scripture and is therefore permissible for consumption. Definition of Halal, HALAL FOOD 
 




reject a vaccine if its development has in any way resulted in the destruction 
of any life form.23 
 
Outside the community of religious devotees whose faiths either forbid or 
disfavor vaccinations, others might object to vaccination on philosophical 
grounds without pointing to any particular religious belief. Such 
philosophies tend to value that which is “natural,” as opposed to a synthetic 
pharmaceutical product. For example, some believe that natural immunity 
acquired through contracting and then fighting off illness is better than 
acquiring that immunity through vaccination.24 Others, in a similar vein, 
believe that contracting certain illnesses helps to build the immune 
system.25 And yet others would rather cultivate immunity through healthy 
diets and lifestyles, rather than by putting extra chemicals into their 
bodies.26 Some philosophical objections, however, take on a more political 
tone: mandatory vaccination represents the state’s intrusion upon a 
person’s bodily integrity and is a symbol of government oppression.27 These 
beliefs usually stem from a distrust of government, scientists, and 
pharmaceutical companies.28 
  
Religious and philosophical objections to vaccination abound, it is clear that 
many will not take the needle lying down. Those who dream of America as 
land of the vaccinated may therefore find that, should the populace be left 
to its own devices, the realization of that dream will remain elusive.  








AUTHORITY, https://www.halalfoodauthority.com/definition-of-halal (last visited Oct. 6, 
2020).  
23 Pelčić et al., supra note 20. 
24 McKee & Bohannon, supra note 15, at 107. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Douglas S. Diekema, Personal Belief Exemptions From School Vaccination Requirements, 35 
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 275, 279–80 (2014). 
28 Id. at 280. 
 






A. Jacobson v. Massachusetts and a State’s Prerogative to Vaccinate 
  
But surely if the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness means 
anything, it must provide Americans the security of knowing that the state 
cannot penetrate a person’s skin and inject him with a foreign substance 
against his will. This is not what our founding fathers fought and died for! 
 
Not so fast. It has been settled law for well over a century that a state may 
do just that. In the 1905 case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a resident of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts was arrested and charged for refusing to 
comply with a smallpox vaccination mandate issued by the city’s board of 
health.29 Facing a five dollar fine,30 the defendant challenged the law, 
claiming that it violated his personal liberty rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.31 The Supreme Court, 
however, held that the authority to enact mandatory vaccination legislation 
is within a state’s police power to protect the public health and safety.32 
Concluding that in enacting the law, the state did not act in an arbitrary or 
unreasonable manner, or go beyond what was reasonably required for 
public safety, the Court upheld the validity of the statute and affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction.33  
  
Thus, Jacobson remains the law of the land. But exactly how far does the 
Court’s seemingly draconian holding extend? The penalty suffered in that 
case was a mere five dollar fine.34 Even measured in today’s dollars, such a 
fine would, for most people, be a small price to pay to maintain one’s bodily 
autonomy, especially when a failure to do so would violate that person’s 
 
29 197 U.S. 11, 13 (1905). 
30 Adjusted for inflation, this amount would be roughly equivalent to $150 in 2020. See 
CPI Inflation Calculator, Official Data Foundation, https://www.in2013dollars.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2020); see also CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).    
31 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 14; Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
32 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.  
33 Id. at 28. 
34 Id. at 21. 
 




most deeply held beliefs. Furthermore, in the mandatory vaccination cases 
that have followed Jacobson, the states have generally declined to paint with 
such a broad brush so as to simply require all residents living within a 
particular jurisdiction to receive a vaccine. In Zucht v. King, for example, the 
Court relied on Jacobson in upholding a mandatory vaccination law, but that 
law only applied to children in schools and other places of education.35 
While Zucht was a civil suit by a parent, as next friend, seeking damages 
and a writ of mandamus to compel his daughter’s admission to public 
school,36 there have been other cases in the state courts where the state has 
turned up the heat on those resisting vaccines. For instance, in Cude v. State 
a parent was both subjected to a fine and deprived custody of his children 
for failing to send his children to school as required by Arkansas law.37 
Although it was the parent’s religious objections to vaccinations that caused 
the school authorities to refuse to admit the children, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court nonetheless affirmed the lower court’s order granting the State 
custody of the children.38 Most states seem to draw the line at 
schoolchildren when deciding the extent of their vaccine mandates. Even 
California’s Full Immunization Act, the purpose of which is to allow for the 
“full and ongoing immunization of all California children,” requires 
vaccination only for children who will eventually enter an educational or 
care facility.39 Thus, while Jacobson, on its face, seems to suggest the 
permissibility of Orwellian state control in administering mandatory 
vaccination laws, in practice, the true amount of compulsion effected by the 
states seems to fall somewhere short of this mark. 
  
Where there’s a will, there’s a way. Even under a broad mandatory 
vaccination scheme, religious devotees who cannot possibly receive the 
vaccine in good conscience can likely find ways to slip through the cracks. 
 
35 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922). 
36 Id. at 175; see also Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ., 58 A.2d 218, 219 (N.J. 1948) (similar suit to 
compel state to grant school admission to unvaccinated children).  
37 377 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ark. 1964). 
38 Id. at 816, 821; see also State v. Drew, 192 A. 629, 631 (N.H. 1937) (parent convicted and 
subjected to a criminal penalty under a similar statutory scheme)  
39 Salasguevara v. Frye, 37 Cal. App. 4th 330, 340–41 (1995) (holding that the vaccinations 
were “required by state law” for all children in the state ages two through seven for the 
purposes of granting physician immunity from malpractice liability for complications 
arising from the vaccine, but not addressing whether a parent who refused to vaccinate 
her child could be subject to criminal liability or some other penalty).  
 




If the vaccination mandates of the past century are any indication of the 
states’ approaches to the current pandemic, then it is likely that many states 
will only require children attending school to receive the vaccine.40 If that is 
the case, parents may opt to homeschool their children to avoid subjecting 
them to vaccination, and there is a strong argument to be made that the 
Constitution requires states to provide this option.41 While the Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed whether parents have a constitutional right to 
homeschool their children, the court did find in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters 
of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary that the Constitution guarantees parents 
the right to send their children to private religious schools, while observing 
that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right . . . to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”42 In this same vein, the Court later held in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder that the state must permit Amish parents to provide informal 
vocational training for their children in lieu of sending them to public high 
schools when doing so would not result in the child’s inability to be self-
supporting or to otherwise participate in society.43 Read together, these 
cases would seem to stand for the proposition that when sending their 
children to school would be in conflict with their religious beliefs, parents 
may choose to homeschool their children so long as their instruction 
adequately meets a state’s reasonable standards set to prepare the child to 
be a functioning and productive member of society.44 
 
Unlike the viruses that we have been dealing with over the past century, 
however, COVID-19 is a different beast and states may find that limiting 
vaccination mandates to schoolchildren inadequately addresses the 
problem. While health policy experts assure that the vaccine police will not 
be busting down our doors, some experts envision inoculation being a 
requirement to participate in many activities such as travelling on an 
 
40 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
41 See Jon S. Lerner, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 391 (1995). 
42 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
43 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
44 See id. at 236; Indeed, this point may now be moot as all fifty states allow parents to 
homeschool their children, subject to varying degrees of regulation. Tasha Swearingen, 
Best States for Homeschooling, HOMESCHOOL.COM (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.homeschool.com/blog/2019/01/best-states-for-homeschooling/.  
 




airplane, attending a sporting event, or even going to work.45 What we have 
learned during this pandemic is that it is possible, if not exactly ideal, to live 
and work from our homes. Those with religious objections to vaccination 
could therefore avoid receiving the shot by simply continuing this lifestyle. 
While some might not have the luxury of a job that allows for remote work, 
it is likely many states will only target certain industries with the vaccine 
mandates.46 Grocery and hospitality workers are two classes that may likely 
be targeted due to their close and frequent contact with co-workers and 
customers.47 Workers in these industries who wish to avoid the vaccine 
could then seek other types of employment that do not require such close 
contact, such as construction, clerical, or warehouse work. Avoiding the 
vaccine at least seems theoretically possible. 
 
B. The Implications of Health Exemptions on Free Exercise Rights 
 
In America, a country founded on principles of pluralism and inclusivity, 
to force those with religious objections to completely alter their lifestyles so 
that they can live in line with their consciences would do violence to the 
spirt of our nation. Such laws would in effect render religious objectors as 
second-class citizens, unable to enjoy basic liberties that the rest of the 
society is free to indulge in. We can do better. 
 
Although Jacobson stands as gatekeeper between religious objectors and the 
doorway to constitutionally-required religious exemptions, there may be a 
way around its holding. States begin to encounter constitutional problems 
when they exempt one class of persons from following an otherwise 
generally applicable law while refusing to grant religious devotees the 
same exemptions for engaging in their practices.48 Therefore, the question 
to be asked first is whether anybody should be exempted from a mandatory 
vaccination law. Rather than tackling the topic of religious exemptions right 
out of the gate, let’s begin with a much less controversial topic: health-based 
 
45 Jillian Kramer, COVID-19 vaccines could become mandatory. Here’s how it might work., 





48 See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), see also Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993).  
 




exemptions. Even the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
recognizes that some people, because of their age, health conditions, or 
other factors, should not get certain vaccines.49 For example, the CDC 
recognizes that certain people who have had seizures, Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome, or who have exhibited an allergic reaction to the DTaP vaccine 
in the past should not receive the vaccine.50 Sensitive to this issue, all states 
of course allow those whose health would be adversely affected to be 
exempt from vaccination laws.51 
 
This however provides the footing that religious objectors need in order 
stake a claim against becoming subjected to mandatory vaccination laws. 
While it is true that a religious devotee is still a member of society and is 
therefore bound to follow its laws, the Supreme Court in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith held that this 
requirement only extends to laws of “general applicability.”52 On the other 
hand, when a law burdening a religious practice is not generally applicable, 
it must undergo “the most rigorous of scrutiny.”53 In Smith, the Court 
refused to recognize a First Amendment right to ingest peyote for 
sacramental purposes when the drug was otherwise banned by Oregon 
law, save for when prescribed by a medical practitioner.54  
 
Turning our attention back to Jacobson, the vaccination statute at issue in 
that case applied across the board to all inhabitants of the city of 
Cambridge, with an exception for children determined by their physicians 
to be unfit for vaccination.55 Keep in mind though, that despite the Court’s 
strict mandatory-vaccination-laws-are-constitutional-period holding, this 
case was not challenged on Free Exercise grounds, and it certainly was not 
 
49 Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with these Vaccines?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/should-not-vacc.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2020). 
50 Id. 
51 Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative 
and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 273 (Richard A. Goodman 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
52 494 U.S. at 879. 
53 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 (1993). 
54 494 U.S. at 890. 
55 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905). 
 




subject to the general applicability test of Smith.56 Thus, in the case of 
religious exemptions to a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination law, Smith — 
not Jacobson — provides the correct framework through which to analyze 
the constitutional requirements of such exemptions.57  
 
An astute observer will quickly point out that even if Smith does provide 
the controlling law, the result should be the same. Like in Smith, where the 
Court refused to grant a religious exemption to a state statute that 
criminalized peyote use in all cases except when prescribed by a doctor,58 
the statute in Jacobson required all Cambridge residents to receive a 
vaccination with an exception for children deemed unfit for vaccination by 
their doctors.59 Under Smith, then, would such a vaccination scheme not be 
considered a law of general applicability? The problem is, while Smith 
certainly set forth the language requiring religious objectors to follow valid 
and neutral laws of general applicability, the Court merely assumed 
without analysis that the law at issue was generally applicable because 
there was no need to define the concept of general applicability.60 The 
doctrine had yet to undergo further development. 
 
The Court again addressed the generally applicability requirement three 
years later in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.61 There, 
members of the Church of Santeria, a religious group that engaged in the 
practice of animal sacrifice, challenged a group of city ordinances that, for 
the purpose of promoting public health and preventing animal cruelty, 
prohibited individuals from killing animals for any type of “ritual,” 
regardless of whether or not animal would then be consumed.62 However, 
the ordinances made an exception for the slaughtering of animals by 
licensed establishments when the animals are specifically raised for food 
purposes.63 The order further prohibited all slaughter of animals for food 
 
56 See id. at 15. 
57 See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
58 494 U.S. at 890. 
59 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12. 
60 Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the 
General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 859 (2001). 
61 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
62 Id. at 528–29, 543. 
63 Id. at 528. 
 




outside of slaughterhouses, but made an exception for the slaughter of a 
small number of hogs and cattle per week for the processing for sale.64 
Furthermore, despite the city’s concern for promoting public health and 
preventing animal cruelty, many other types of animal killings remained 
legal: fishing, hunting, rodent extermination, and euthanasia of stray 
animals.65 The Court concluded that the city’s ordinances were not 
generally applicable because they were underinclusive in achieving the 
purpose of preventing animal cruelty by continuing to allow many types of 
non-religious killings.66 The Court further concluded that the city’s 
ordinances also were underinclusive in regard to protecting against the 
public health threat posed by the disposal of animal carcasses in public and 
the consumption of uninspected meat because that threat is no greater in 
cases of ritual sacrifice than it is in cases of the non-proscribed killings.67 
 
In Lukumi, because the ordinances fell “well below the minimum standard 
necessary to protect First Amendment rights,” the Court decided that it did 
not need to “define with precision” the standard to be used in evaluating 
whether a law is generally applicable.68 However, scholars who have 
dissected Lukumi and the general applicability standard have proposed that 
a law is underinclusive, and therefore not generally applicable, if it fails to 
pursue a government interest uniformly against other conduct that causes 
a similar harm to the interest.69 Therefore, in Lukumi, the ordinances would 
have failed the general applicability requirement if they provided any 
exemptions for non-religious conduct that threatens public health and 
animal welfare.70 This understanding is consistent with the inviolable 
nature of our First Amendment rights, and is in the spirit of Justice 
Kennedy’s command when he asserted in Lukumi that “categories of 
selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of 
burdening religious practice.”71 
 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 543–44. 
66 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. 
67 Id. at 544–45. 
68 Id. at 543. 
69 Duncan, supra note 59, at 868; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through it: 
Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 264 (1995). 
70 See Duncan, supra note 59, at 869. 
71 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). This principle was established by the Court 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 
 





With the general applicability framework laid down, we can now turn our 
attention to how this will affect the requirement for a religious exemption 
to a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination law. If a state chooses to allow 
exemptions for those whose health would be adversely affected by the 
vaccine — as all states have done for other vaccines and should do for the 
COVID-19 vaccine as well72 — the exemptions would render the law not 
generally applicable under Smith and Lukumi. Remember that when a law 
grants exemptions, to remain generally applicable, those exemptions must 
not detract from the law’s ability to pursue its objectives.73 While it might 
be argued that a medical exemption, by its very nature, would not detract 
from — and may even further — a vaccination law’s objective of promoting 
public health, the law’s objective should be viewed more narrowly than 
simply the promotion of health in general. Instead, the law’s actual goal is 
to prevent the spread of an airborne infectious disease, which has nothing 
to do with an individual’s allergic or otherwise negative reaction to the 
vaccine. And if an individual were unable to be vaccinated due to health 
reasons, that individual would be more prone to spreading the virus, 
thereby compromising the law’s effectiveness. 
 
Now, compare this to a law such as the one at issue in Smith, in which the 
Court concluded that the law was one of general applicability.74 Recall that 
in that case, the statute forbade the ingestion of peyote with a single 
exception for when the drug had been prescribed by a medical 
 
141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020). In that case, the Court struck down a state executive order that 
limited capacity on places of worship without placing similar restrictions on comparable 
secular businesses which were deemed “essential,” including acupuncture clinics, liquor 
stores, bicycle repair shops, laundromats, and banks. Id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
Observing that many of these “essential” businesses contributed to the spread of the 
virus just as much, if not more, than the churches seeking relief, the Court, citing Lukumi, 
concluded that the restrictions were not generally applicable and that they therefore must 
be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 67. 
72 Malone & Hinman, supra note 51, at 273. Failing to provide a health exemption would 
be in violation of the Hippocratic Oath, every doctor’s fundamental promise to “follow 
that system of regimen which, according to [the doctor’s] ability and judgment, [the 
doctor] consider[s] for the benefit of [the] patients, and abstain from whatever is 
deleterious and mischievous.” Robert H. Shmerling, First, do no harm, HARV. MED. SCH. 
(Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/first-do-no-harm-201510138421.  
73 Duncan, supra note 59, at 869. 
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practitioner.75 It can be assumed that the reason for prohibiting peyote was 
to protect both individuals from harmful health effects associated with 
ingesting the substance, as well as society from the negative social effects 
associate with drug use.76 However, when the drug has been prescribed by 
a doctor, it has been deemed not only safe for the patient, but even 
beneficial to that person’s health, and the clinical setting for the drug’s use 
neutralizes any negative effects that the patient’s use might have on 
society.77 Thus, unlike a health exemption to a COVID-19 vaccination 
mandate, which would continue to place the greater population (and even 
the individual claiming the exemption) at risk of infection, because the 
medical exemption to the peyote law failed to detract from the law’s ability 
to achieve its intended goals, the law was generally applicable and the state 
was therefore not required to provide a religious exemption. 
 
The secular-minded will certainly be uncomfortable with this conclusion — 
medical reasons for granting an exemption to a law must take precedence 
over religious reasons; a state must be able to grant an exemption to protect 
an individual’s health and well-being (and maybe even that person’s very 
survival) without having to grant the same exemption to religious 
objectors! However, courts have held just the opposite. Take, for example, 
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,78 a Third 
Circuit case dealing with a police department policy prohibiting all officers 
from growing beards except for when a beard would be necessary for 
medical reasons.79 In an opinion by then-Judge Alito, the court reasoned 
that the department’s interest in conveying the image of a “monolithic, 
highly disciplined force” would be no less undermined when an officer 
displayed a beard for medical reasons than it would be when the beard is 
displayed for religious reasons.80 The court struck down any notion that 
medical interests are sacrosanct while religious interests are something less 
when it observed that “the medical exemption raises concern because it 
indicates that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., 
medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to 
 
75 Id. at 874. 
76 See Duncan, supra note 59, at 878. 
77 See id. 
78 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
79 Typically due to the skin condition known as pseudo folliculitis barbae. Id.  
80 Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 




overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations 
are not,” and it held that “when the government makes a value judgment 
in favor of secular motivations, but not religious motivations, the 
government’s actions must survive heightened scrutiny.”81 
 
C. The Hybrid Rights Avenue to Strict Scrutiny 
 
Although a state’s health exemptions to a mandatory COVID-19 
vaccination law would place any refusal to grant similar religious 
exemptions safely within the lush green fields of strict scrutiny analysis, 
there is more than one pathway to the promised land. Recall Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, mentioned earlier, where the Court held that Amish parents were 
entitled to keep their teenage children out of high school and instead 
provide informal vocational training despite a state law requiring all 
parents to send their children to public or private school until age sixteen.82  
This law was generally applicable, yet in ordering the religious exemption 
the Court declared that “only those interests of the highest order and those 
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise 
of religion.”83  
 
So, then, did Smith overrule Yoder? No. In his opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia 
distinguished Yoder and other similar cases84 where the Court granted 
religious exemptions to neutral, generally applicable laws by observing that 
these cases were “hybrid” situations where Free Exercise was not the only 
constitutional right at issue, but rather the state action encroached on other 
rights as well.85 In fact, the Court in Yoder said so much when it declared 
 
81 Id.  
82 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
83 Id. at 215. 
84 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (freedom of speech interest 
implicated when a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations gave the 
administrator discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (freedom of press implicated when a 
flat tax on solicitation was applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follet v. 
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577–78 (1944) (same); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (right of parents to send their 
children to private religious schools involves their constitutional right to direct the 
education of their children). 
85 Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 




that “when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise 
claim . . . , more than merely a reasonable relation to some purpose within 
the competency of the State is required to sustain the validity of the State’s 
requirement under the First Amendment.”86 Thus, in these “hybrid” cases, 
state actions that burden religious exercise must pass strict scrutiny 
review.87 
 
So what constitutional right, other than Free Exercise, might be implicated 
by a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination law? In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, the Court found a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.88 In that case, the Court 
had to grapple with the issue of whether to allow the removal of life-
supporting feeding and hydration systems from a car accident victim who 
was in a persistent vegetative state when the victim’s family put forth 
evidence indicating that prior to the accident the victim had expressed to a 
friend that, if she ever became seriously sick or injured, she would not wish 
to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally.89 
Although the Court found a constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment, even if such refusal would result in the death of the patient, the 
Court held that this right was not absolute, but that to overcome the State’s 
countervailing interest in preserving the life of the patient, the State could 
require clear and convincing proof that the patient would in fact wish to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment.90 
 
Of course, the mere fact that an individual’s constitutional right to refuse 
treatment may be overcome by a sufficiently compelling state interest does 
not mean that it cannot form the basis of a hybrid rights claim to refuse a 
mandatory vaccination. If that were the case, there would be no need for 
the hybrid rights doctrine at all because a person wishing to avoid a 
 
86 406 U.S. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87 Duncan, supra note 59, at 858–59. Even amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court has 
reassured that the hybrid rights doctrine remains alive and well. See Danville Christian 
Acad. v. Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527, 528 (2020). 
88 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The Court even cited Jacobson when it found this constitutional 
right to refuse treatment. Id. The Court observed that in Jacobson there was in fact an 
individual liberty interest in declining an unwanted vaccine, but that such liberty interest 
failed to overcome the State’s interest in preventing disease. Id.  
89 Id. at 266–67. 
90 Id. at 282. 
 




mandatory vaccine for religious reasons could simply bring his claim under 
the other, more inviolable, constitutional right. While one might argue that 
when two constitutional rights are not independently sufficient to trigger 
heightened scrutiny this deficiency is not cured simply by implicating them 
together in a single constitutional claim — zero plus zero, after all, does not 
add up to one — it can also be argued that two halves make a whole and 
that therefore, the more constitutional rights at issue the more compelling 
justification there is for heightened scrutiny.91 Regardless of the logic (or 
lack thereof) underlying this rule, the hybrid rights doctrine remains that 
law and a person with religious objections to a mandatory COVID-19 
vaccination law can trigger strict scrutiny by asserting that his 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment is also implicated by the 
mandate.92 
 
D. The Viability of a COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate Under Strict 
Scrutiny Analysis 
 
While we have established two alternate avenues for requiring a vaccine 
mandate without religious exemptions to undergo strict scrutiny analysis, 
we are not out of the woods yet. Although it has been oftentimes observed 
that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”93 a state could 
nonetheless choose to withhold religious exemptions so long as doing so 
would be the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest.94 
 
The first question to be answered, then, is whether a mandatory COVID-19 
vaccination law would serve a compelling governmental interest. While the 
purpose of a mandatory vaccination law would be to achieve herd 
 
91 Duncan, supra note 59, at 858. 
92 See id.; Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 14 (1905) (defendant asserting right 
to exemption from vaccine mandate brought no Free Exercise basis for his refusal to 
comply with the law). 
93 Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for 
a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6 (1984).  
94 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695 (2014); see also Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2018). 
 




immunity to the virus,95 there is still the question as to whether that interest 
is a compelling one. Although the Supreme Court has never assessed a 
mandatory vaccination law under the modern strict scrutiny analytical 
framework, the Court has suggested that the interests served by such a law 
would be sufficiently compelling to satisfy this element of the strict scrutiny 
analysis.96 More broadly speaking, the Court has directly stated that 
combating the spread of COVID-19 qualifies as a compelling governmental 
interest.97 This comes as no surprise, considering the fact that the Court has 
long recognized compelling interests when serious and widespread threats 
to public safety and welfare are at issue.98 
 
Things become more interesting when we ask whether a vaccination law 
without any religious exemptions can qualify as the least restrictive means 
of achieving the law’s objectives. Keep in mind that the least restrictive 
means test really means what it says: a law burdening the free exercise of 
one’s faith will fail under strict scrutiny analysis unless there is absolutely 
no other way to accomplish the law’s objectives.99 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., the Court assumed the task of determining whether a law that 
required employers to provide insurance coverage for abortifacient 
contraceptives, yet failed to exempt closely held corporations owned by 
persons whose religious beliefs would forbid them from providing such 
coverage, accomplished its goals by the least restrictive means possible.100 
The Court concluded that it did not.101 It reasoned that, due to the small 
percentage of the population that works for corporations whose owners 
object to funding the abortifacients, and the fact that these methods of 
contraceptives are only used in emergency situations, the cost of providing 
 
95 See Kristin Samuelson, Should a COVID-19 vaccine be mandated?, Nw. U. (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2020/11/should-a-covid-19-vaccine-be-mandated/.  
96 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905)). 
97 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020). 
98 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (threat of Japanese 
espionage during World War II found sufficiently compelling to justify executive order 
directing all persons of Japanese ancestry to be excluded from the designated “Military 
Area” of San Leandro, California); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (United States 
citizen’s activities directed at undermining CIA’s activities in foreign country sufficient to 
warrant revocation of his passport due to the compelling interest in national security). 
99 See Burwell, 573 U.S. at 728. 
100 Id. at 688–91. 
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these contraceptives would be so minor that, in these cases, there is no 
reason for why the government could not pay for the coverage itself.102 The 
Court further reasoned that, because the government already had a 
program in place that allowed other religious organizations and nonprofits 
to exempt themselves from contraceptive coverage while still ensuring their 
employees’ access to these contraceptives, there was no reason for why this 
program could not be extended to corporations.103 
 
Bearing in mind that the purpose of a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination 
law would be to ensure herd immunity amongst the relevant population, 
the question then is whether, in denying religious exemptions to the law, 
the law’s purpose is being served in the least restrictive means possible. 
Although experts are still uncertain as to the precise level of inoculation 
needed for the population to achieve herd immunity, they estimate this 
number to be around 70%.104 While it is too soon to determine the 
percentage of the population that will need a medical exemption from the 
COVID-19 vaccine, if recent medical exemption rates among the nation’s 
schoolchildren for other required vaccines are any indication, then this 
number may be estimated to be less than 1%.105 This leaves room for an 
additional 29% of the population to forgo vaccination before it can be 
expected that herd immunity will be compromised. So, will 29% of the 
population seek to claim a religious exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine? 
Not likely. A study in the American Journal of Pediatrics reported that 
between 2011 and 2018, the number of children entering kindergarten 
claiming religious exemptions to vaccination never exceeded 2% in any 
 
102 Id. at 728–29. 
103 Id. at 730–32. 
104 Len Strazewski, Why hopes for fast track to coronavirus herd immunity don’t add up, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/public-
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Herd Immunity and Implications for SARS-CoV-2 Control, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2772167; COVID-19 Vaccine Key to 
Reaching ‘Herd Immunity’, U. MO. HEALTH CARE, https://www.muhealth.org/our-
stories/covid-19-vaccine-key-reaching-herd-immunity (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
105 Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage with Selected Vaccines and Exemption Rates 
Among Children in Kindergarten — United States, 2018–19 School Year, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 18, 2019), 
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given year.106 The prediction that few will seek religious exemptions is 
bolstered by the fact that adherents to the Christian Science faith — the only 
major religion in the United States to formally oppose vaccination107 — 
comprise less than 0.4% of the population.108 In fact, in the 2018–2019 school 
year, the total number of schoolchildren claiming an exemption for any 
reason was a mere 2.5%.109 No matter how you look at it, the number of 
persons who may be entitled to claim an exemption, religious or otherwise, 
falls far short of the 30% threshold where the goal of herd immunity 
becomes threated. 
 
Looking to Burwell for guidance, we can conclude that a vaccination law 
that denies religious exemptions would fail to serve the goal of herd 
immunity in the least restrictive means possible. Recall that in Burwell, the 
Court based its decision to require religious exemptions, which thereby 
called for the government to shoulder the cost of providing coverage for the 
contraceptives, largely on the fact that such a small portion of the total 
population both (a) worked for employers with religious objections to 
providing coverage for abortifacients, and (b) would even need to use these 
contraceptives during the course of their employment due to the 
abortifacients’ emergency nature.110 Similarly, in the case of a COVID-19 
vaccination law, if recent vaccine exemption trends are any indication, then 
the number of persons both entitled to and wishing to avail themselves of 
an exemption would be so small that such exemptions could not possibly 
pose any reasonable threat to herd immunity.111  Under the reasoning in 
Burwell, then, providing accommodation to those individuals whose 
religious convictions forbid them from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine 
would serve a state’s interest in herd immunity just as effectively as would 
a harsh exemption-free mandate.112 Because such a mandate would fail to 
 
106 Joshua T.B. Williams et al., Religious Vaccine Exemptions in Kindergartners: 2011–2018, J. 
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achieve herd immunity by the least restrictive means possible, it could not 




While many might muse over ideals of self-sacrifice in service of the 
common good, it must be remembered that we live in a society governed 
by the rule of law as enshrined our Constitution, a constitution which 
guarantees certain fundamental liberties in the Bill of Rights. At the helm 
of this Bill of Rights is the First Amendment and its Free Exercise Clause, 
which guarantees each citizen the security of knowing that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of his religion.113 Although, 
as we have seen, there are limits to this right, this basic liberty forms the 
bedrock of our national identity and should not be lightly cast aside.  
 
This basic principal of our Constitution holds just as true when a person’s 
faith precludes him from accepting a vaccination as it does for others who 
might seek to participate in Holy Communion or to be excused from work 
to pray the Salah.114 Although sweeping vaccination mandates were once 
thought to be beyond the reaches of the Constitution, in light of the 
development of Free Exercise jurisprudence over the past century, it is time 
to reconsider this broad power that we unquestioningly believed the states 
to hold, at least when religious interests are at stake. For better or worse, it 
is often crisis that fuels change. Perhaps, then, the COVID-19 crisis will 
provide the fertile soil for the Court to firmly establish that which is 
necessitated by its Free Exercise jurisprudence: a COVID-19 vaccination 
mandate that fails to accommodate religious objectors would unlawfully 
value the secular over the religious and would needlessly restrict the free 




113 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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